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19861 SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick Iron & Steel Co. Reversing
the lower court determination, the Horn Waterproofing Court held
that UCC 1-207 supersedes the common law doctrine of accord and
satisfaction in situations involving the tender of negotiable instru-
ments in full satisfaction of disputed debts.
The members of Volume 60 hope that the analysis of the cases
contained in The Survey will be of interest and value to the New
York bench and bar.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
Tenant's conditional contract to sell his apartment upon con-
version to condominium ownership does not violate "no assign-
ment" clause in standard lease
In New York, the ability of a landlord to convert a rental
apartment building into a cooperative1 or condominium' is condi-
' See P. ROHAN, REAL PROPERTY § 9.01 at 9-1 (1981). Cooperatives first gained signifi-
cance in the United States during the housing shortage after World War I. Id. Since then,
their popularity has increased dramatically, especially in the bigger cities where it is imprac-
tical to build single-family structures due to the scarcity of land. Id.; see also P. KEHOE,
COOPERATIVES AND CONDOMINIUMS 7 (1974) (more efficient land use necessary in metropolitan
areas in mid-1950s). In organizing a cooperative, a corporation is formed and a parcel of real
estate is conveyed to it. P. ROHAN, supra, § 9.04(4)(a) at 9-13. Prospective tenants then
purchase shares of stock in the corporation that are allocated to certain apartments. Id. A
proprietary lease, and not mere ownership of corporate shares, entitles a stockholder to oc-
cupy an apartment. Id. A lessee, however, must possess a specific amount of shares in order
to obtain a proprietary lease from the cooperative corporation. P. ROHAN, supra, § 9.04(4)(a)
at 9-13. A cooperative tenant's proprietary lease is actually "a contract for the 'use' of real
property, but not a real property interest itself." Id., § 9.03 at 9-6. A tenant's interest in the
cooperative is more appropriately referred to as "personalty". See id. See generally H.
ROTHENBERG, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT CoNDoMiuMs 21 (1974)(corporation holds
title to realty; shareholders receive right to exclusive occupancy and must transfer shares to
transfer right of occupancy). For a more extensive look at proprietary leases, see P. KEHOE,
supra, at 24, and Kamer, Conversion of Rental Housing to Unit Ownership - A Noncrisis,
10 REAL ESTATE L.J. 189 (1982).
2 See 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.01(1) at 1-1
(1985). A condominium is "a system of separate ownership of individual units in multi-unit
projects." Id. Condominiums are a relatively recent phenomenon; through the Horizontal
Property Act of 1958, Puerto Rico became the first American legal jurisdiction to authorize
them. See P. KEHOE, supra note 1, at 8. By 1969, however, all 50 states had enacted laws
specifically authorizing condominiums. See id. In a condominium, the participants have fee
simple ownership of their units individually, and of the common elements as tenants in
common in undivided percentages. See D. CLURMAN, F. JACKSON & E. HEBARD, CONDOMINI-
UMS AND COOPERATIVES 1 (2d ed. 1984); P. ROHAN, supra note 1, § 9.02(3) at 9-5; H. ROTHEN-
BERG, supra note 1, at 19-20. The ownership of a condominium unit is very similar to own-
ing an individual home because the unit owner must arrange and pay for the financing of
the condominium unit. P. ROHAN, supra note 1, § 9.02(3) at 9-5. Along with the real estate
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tioned upon his obtaining a minimum number of written purchase
agreements from the tenants.- In an effort to attain this statutory
minimum, sponsors offer tenants the right to purchase their apart-
ments at a substantial discount as an incentive measure.4 The exis-
tence of this "insider price" has prompted some tenants to seek
profits by devising methods to sell at a premium the advantage
accorded by such a price.5 Recently, in Continental Towers Lim-
taxes on the unit, an owner must pay his percentage of the real estate taxes on the common
elements. Id. As in the case of individual home ownership, these taxes and the interest on
the mortgage are deductible for federal income tax purposes. Id.
3 See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352-eee(2)(c)(i), -eee(2)(d)(i), -eeee(2)(c)(i), -eeee(2)(d)(i)
(McKinney 1984). A sponsor may employ either a non-eviction or an eviction offering plan
in converting a rental apartment building. See id. at §§ 352-eee(1)(b), -eee(1)(c), -eeee(1)(b),
-eeee(1)(c). An eviction plan is "[a] plan which ... can result in the eviction of a non-
purchasing tenant by reason of the tenant failing to purchase pursuant thereto...." Id. at
§§§ 352-eee(1)(c), -eeee(1)(c).
In Nassau, Rockland and Westchester Counties, a non-eviction plan requires written
purchase agreements from at least 15% of the bona fide tenants in occupancy on the date
the plan is declared effective. Id. at §§ 352-eee(2)(c)(i), -eee(7). An eviction plan in these
counties, however, requires written purchase agreements from: (1) at least 51% of the bona
fide tenants in occupancy on the date the Attorney General accepts the plan for filing, ex-
cluding the number of eligible senior citizens and disabled persons; and (2) at least 35% of
the bona fide tenants in occupancy on the acceptance date including the apartments of eligi-
ble senior citizens and disabled persons. Id. at § 352-eee(2)(d)(i).
A non-eviction conversion plan in New York City requires written purchase agreements
from at least 15% of the bona fide tenants in occupancy or bona fide purchasers (non-tenant
purchasers) who represent that they or their immediate family members intend to occupy
the unit upon vacancy. Id. at § 352-eeee(2)(c)(i). An eviction plan in New York City, how-
ever, requires written purchase agreements from 51% of the bona fide tenants in occupancy
on the acceptance date, excluding eligible senior citizens and disabled persons. Id. at § 352-
eeee(2)(d)(i).
" See Goldsmith, Real Estate Financing, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352, commentary at 32,
49 (McKinney 1984). In an offering plan, "tenants in occupancy" are generally offered a
price reduction, occasionally as much as 50% of market value, in an effort to induce them to
purchase their units, and thereby help the sponsor meet the minimum purchases require-
ment. See id.; supra note 3. The attainment of this minimum is so critical that sponsors
occasionally resort to less scrupulous methods of promoting sales. See, e.g., Richards v. Kas-
kel, 32 N.Y.2d 524, 533, 300 N.E.2d 388, 391, 347 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6 (1973)(sponsor falsely in-
formed tenants that offering plan had "gone over the top" to induce them to purchase their
apartments); Gilligan v. Tishman Realty & Constr. Co., 283 App. Div. 157, 163, 126
N.Y.S.2d 813, 818 (1st Dep't 1953)(sponsor threatened tenants that if they did not purchase
their units they would be "sleeping in Central Park"), aff'd, 306 N.Y. 974, 120 N.E.2d 230
(1954).
5 See, e.g., University Mews Assoc. v. Jeanmarie, 122 Misc. 2d 434, 438, 471 N.Y.S.2d
457, 460 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983) (prior to closing, tenants contracted to sell apartment
shares to third parties subsequent to closing to generate profit equal to difference between
insider and outsider price). Much confusion and litigation has arisen in recent years as to
who has the right to purchase at an insider price. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. 10 W.
66th St. Corp., 61 N.Y.2d 341, 462 N.E.2d 367, 474 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1984)(whether corporate
tenant was "tenant in occupancy" entitled to right to purchase apartment at insider price);
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ited Partnership v. Kratalic," the Appellate Term, First Depart-
ment held that a tenant did not violate a standard lease provision
prohibiting the unauthorized assignment of the lease when he con-
ditionally contracted to sell his apartment upon conversion to con-
dominium ownership.7
In Continental, the plaintiff landlord filed an offering plan
with the Attorney General of the State of New Yorks seeking to
convert his rent stabilized apartment building to condominium
ownership.8 Prior to the Attorney General's approval of the con-
version plan, the tenants contracted with a non-tenant purchaser
to convey their apartment to the "outsider," contingent upon the
tenants' acquisition of the unit and the implementation of the con-
version plan. 10 The contract also provided that the third-party
buyer was to advance to the tenant-sellers the funds necessary to
purchase the condominium unit at the insider price, along with an
additional $25,000 premium, as consideration." The landlord
brought an eviction proceeding against the tenants alleging that
this contract was a violation of the standard lease clause which
prohibited assignments of the lease without prior written con-
sent. 2 The Civil Court of the City of New York, New York
Hohenstein v. Hohenstein, 127 Misc. 2d 53, 485 N.Y.S.2d 170 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1984)(husband who had separated from wife and moved out of apartment sought to
purchase as "tenant in occupancy" upon wife's death); Stuart v. One Sherman Square As-
soc., 123 Misc. 2d 414, 473 N.Y.S.2d 669 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984)(one co-tenant sought
to enjoin another co-tenant from purchasing unit upon conversion at insider price); cf. Freu-
denstein v. 645 Co., 128 Misc. 2d 635, 493 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1985)(whether right of statutory tenant to purchase at insider price passed to estate upon
his death); In re Lipkowitz, 127 Misc. 2d 77, 485 N.Y.S.2d 466 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1985)(whether executor had right to purchase on behalf of deceased tenant's estate).
6 N.Y.L.J., July 22, 1985, at 6, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1985).
Id.; see also Wise, Tenant Allowed to Sell Rights to Co-Op at 'Insider' Discount,
N.Y.L.J., July 22, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
8 See Continental, N.Y.L.J., July 22, 1985, at 6, col. 2. See generally N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAw § 352-e(1)(a) (McKinney 1984)("public offering or sale in or from the state of New
York of securities constituted of participation interests or investments in real estate" must
be registered with attorney general); Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 33-34 (language of § 352-
e(1)(a) sufficiently broad to include condominiums and cooperatives).
9 See Continental, N.Y.L.J., July 22, 1985, at 6, col. 2.
10 Id.
11 Id. In Continental the contract stipulated that the $25,000 premium was to be paid
in three separate installments: "(i) $5,000 upon execution of [the] agreement; (ii) $3,000
upon seller vacating the apartment unit. . . and, of course, there follows (iii) a balance of
$17,000 at time of closing ...... Record on Appeal at 39, Continental Towers Ltd. Partner-
ship v. Kratalic, N.Y.L.J., July 22, 1985, at 6, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1985) [here-
inafter cited as Record on Appeal].
12 Continental, N.Y.L.J., July 22, 1985, at 6, col. 2.
1986]
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County, dismissed the petition, and the landlord appealed.13
The Appellate Term, First Department rejected the landlord's
contention that the lease was violated, ruling that there had been
no actual assignment of the lease.14 In reaching this result, the
court noted that the tenants were still in possession of the unit at
the time of the trial and had not transferred a right of present
occupancy to the non-tenant purchaser.' The appellate term de-
termined that the contract was not to become effective until the
landlord-tenant relationship had been terminated by the respon-
dent's acquisition of his unit subsequent to the conversion of the
building.'" The court unanimously concluded that the "conditional
agreement" to sell the apartment unit did not constitute a breach
of the "no assignment" clause in the lease.17
It is submitted that the holding in Continental did little to
clear up the gray area surrounding the transferability of the right
to purchase at an insider price. In addressing only the narrow issue
of whether the agreement violated the "no assignment" clause in
the lease, the court did not reach the broader question of the as-
signability of the right to purchase at the insider price.' e It is sug-
11 See id. The landlord's petition was dismissed with prejudice, and possession of the
premises was awarded to the tenant. See Record on Appeal at 2.
" Continental, N.Y.L.J., July 22, 1985, at 6, col. 2. But see Record on Appeal at 75 ("a
very close point" as to whether or not contract of sale was assignment).
11 Continental, N.Y.L.J., July 22, 1985, at 6, col. 2. The court noted that the tenants
would have been required to vacate the premises only upon the transfer of ownership to the
third-party buyer. Id.
16 Id.; see also Record on Appeal at 75 ("[The purchaser has] never asked [the tenant]
for the assignment. . . and he hasn't given it yet. . . .What you've done here is - to put it
more formally - he has agreed to give an assignment upon the happening of certain events.
They have not taken place yet.")(remarks of Judge Sparks at trial).
'7 Continental, N.Y.L.J., July 22, 1985, at 6, col. 2. The contract in Continental speci-
fied that if the purchaser desired an assignment of the tenant's lease term, the written con-
sent of the landlord would be necessary. Id. Thus, the tenants specifically contracted to
obtain the landlord's approval in the event they wished to assign the lease. Id.
'8 See Continental, N.Y.L.J., July 22, 1985, at 6, col. 2. In a similar case involving con-
ditional sales, another court did reach the merits of the validity of the contract. See Univer-
sity Mews Assoc. v. Jeanmarie, 122 Misc. 2d 434, 442, 471 N.Y.S.2d 457, 463 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1983). In University Mews, the owner-sponsor of a rent stabilized building filed a
cooperative offering plan with the New York State Attorney General. Id. at 436, 471
N.Y.S.2d at 459. Several tenants contracted with outsiders to purchase their apartments at
the insider price and to resell the apartments to those outsiders at a premium. Id. at 438,
471 N.Y.S.2d at 460. Although the facts were almost identical to those underlying Continen-
tal, the court in University Mews ruled on the validity of the contracts, referring to them as
"equitable assignments . . . that became legal assignments upon title closing." Id. at 442,
471 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
An equitable assignment creates a title in an assignee which will be recognized and
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gested that far from clarifying the assignability of this right, the
court may have complicated the issue further by inviting landlords
to devise lease clauses that can withstand judicial scrutiny and
thereby create roadblocks for tenants who wish to indirectly assign
their rights in the manner attempted in Continental. In addition
to employing such lease clauses, it is submitted that building own-
ers seeking to convert can condition offers to convey at insider
prices with language that precludes any possibility of circumven-
tion.19 However, such language must adequately cover the event in
question, or a court may construe the clause narrowly and hold in
favor of a tenant-seller.20 A cooperative or condominium board also
has at its disposal the right of first refusal, but the utility of this
device is rather limited.21 In cooperative conversions, the imposi-
protected by a court of equity. See Comment, Creation of an Equitable Assignment, 21 ST.
JOHN'S L. Rav. 202, 202 (1947). A court of law, however, will not recognize such an assign-
ment "because either the legal title to the property or fund assigned has not passed or the
thing assigned is not in esse at the time." Id. On the other hand "an assignment is an actual
or constructive transfer of some species of property, or interest in property with a clear
intent at the time to part with all interest in the thing transferred." Id.
" See De Christoforo v. Shore Ridge Assoc., 126 Misc. 2d 339, 340, 482 N.Y.S.2d 411,
412 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1984)("sponsor, drafter of the agreement, may condition his
offer at an 'insider price' in any manner he chooses, subject to the applicable statute and
approval of the Attorney-General [sic]").
20 See University Mews Assoc. v. Jeanmarie, 122 Misc. 2d 434, 471 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1983). In University Mews, the cooperative offering plan included a sub-
scription agreement which stated that the rights under the agreement were not assignable
without the consent of the corporation and that an assignment without such consent would
be null and void. Id. at 437, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 459. The agreement also provided that the
cooperative shares were to be purchased for the tenant's own account and for his personal
occupancy. Id. at 437, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 460. The offering plan, however, provided that the
tenant could sell and assign his proprietary lease at any time as long as he complied with
the provisions of the proprietary lease and the by-laws. Id. The court held that the tenant
was free to assign "where the contract to sell is executed before title closing so long as it is
effective thereafter following tenant-shareholders' personal occupancy, however brief, of
the co-operative apartment and is subject to tenant shareholder's compliance with ...
the proprietary lease." Id. at 443, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 463; see also De Christoforo v. Shore
Ridge Assoc., 126 Misc. 2d 339, 340, 482 N.Y.S.2d 411, 413 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1984)(sponsor's omission of clause in offering plan precluding specific event must be con-
strued against him). But see Sini v. Hyngstrom, 109 App. Div. 2d 671, 671, 486 N.Y.S.2d
253, 254 (1st Dep't 1985)(clause prohibiting assignment of right to purchase under subscrip-
tion agreement enforceable, even though there was no provision rendering assignment with
corporation's consent void).
21 See Bachman v. State Div. of Human Rights, 104 App. Div. 2d 111, 114, 481
N.Y.S.2d 858, 860 (1st Dep't 1984)(cooperative board of directors had "contractual and in-
herent power" to exercise right of first refusal absent discrimination prohibited by law); P.
KEHOE, supra note 1, at 47. Upon exercise of the right of first refusal, a cooperative or
condominium board is usually required to purchase the unit at the same price that the seller
could have received from the rejected buyer. Id. In the long run, the tenant-seller sells the
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tion of a "flip tax" in the apartment corporation's by-laws may fur-
ther discourage transfer schemes of tenants 2 - although the spon-
sor of a condominium conversion may not be able to avail himself
of this weapon.23
While the courts have demonstrated some degree of flexibility
in permitting purchases at insider prices,24 it is submitted that fur-
unit or shares as he had originally planned. Id. In a condominium, the right of first refusal
may be restricted by the common law rule which "prohibits unreasonable restraints on the
transfer of a real estate title." Id. See generally D. CLURMAN, F. JACKSON & E. HEBARD,
supra note 2, at 92 (condominium board may exercise right of first refusal and purchase
unit at best outside price offered after unit owner gives notice of proposed sale); Note, Con-
dominiums and the Right of First Refusal, Symposium on the Law of Condominiums, 48
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1146, 1146 (1974)(right of first refusal exercised by cooperative board to
promote "harmonious living").
2 See D. CLURMAN, F. JACKSON & E. HEBARD, supra note 2, at 92. A board of directors
will often enact a provision in its by-laws providing that, upon resale of a cooperative unit, a
percentage of the profits will be payable to the board. Id.; see, e.g., Mayerson v. 3701 Te-
nants Corp., 123 Misc. 2d 235, 235, 473 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984)
(transfer fee imposed to discourage purchasers from engaging in speculative practices); Uni-
versity Mews Assoc. v. Jeanmarie, 122 Misc. 2d 434, 443, 471 N.Y.S.2d 457, 463 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1983)(under proprietary lease, cooperative corporation could "set reasonable
legal and other expenses including a so-called 'flip' tax"). The enactment of a transfer fee or
"flip tax" is derived "from the inherent powers of a Board of Directors to manage the affairs
of the property." Mayerson, 123 Misc. 2d at 236, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 124. But see Frymer v.
Bell, 99 App. Div. 2d 91, 93, 472 N.Y.S.2d 622, 624 (1st Dep't 1984)(transfer fee of "20% of
the difference between the prospectus price and the 'market value' of the apartment...
arbitrarily fixed at 3.75 times the prospectus price" deemed illegal exaction with no lawful
basis); 330 W. End Apartment Corp. v. Kelly, 124 Misc. 2d 870, 874, 478 N.Y.S.2d 220, 223
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984)(under terms of proprietary lease, cooperative board of directors
failed to obtain necessary shareholder approval to assess flip tax on tenant for sale and
assignment of his lease to third party).
23 See Siegler, Is a Condominium Flip Tax Permissible?, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 3, 1985, at 1,
col. 1. The common law rule prohibiting illegal restraints on alienation may operate to inval-
idate a resale fee in the area of condominiums. See id.; cf. supra note 21 (right of first
refusal may be unreasonable restraint on alienation); Laguna Royale Owners Assoc. v.
Darger, 119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 683-84, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136, 144-45 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)(restric-
tion on right of alienation of condominium will be upheld if rationally related to protection
of property, nondiscriminatory, and consequences of restriction are not severe); White Egret
Condominium, Inc., v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346, 350 (Fla. 1979) ("condominium restriction or
limitation does not inherently violate a fundamental right and may be enforced if it serves a
legitimate purpose and is reasonably applied"). Cooperatives and condominiums are similar
in that they both involve "the close proximity of residents and the use of common facili-
ties." See Siegler, supra, at 32, col. 3. Thus, the lifestyle afforded by both is more restrictive
than one would encounter in a single-family detached house. Id. Although the cooperative
form of ownership does not involve a fee simple interest in realty, the use of flip taxes in the
realm of condominiums would promote similar policy considerations concerning "shared liv-
ing facilities" that justify resale fees in a cooperative corporation's by-laws. See id.
24 See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. 10 W. 66th St. Corp., 61 N.Y.2d 341, 344-45, 462
N.E.2d 367, 368, 474 N.Y.S.2d 267, 268 (1984)(corporation entitled to purchase at insider
price through corporate designee); In re Lipkowitz, 127 Misc. 2d 77, 80, 485 N.Y.S.2d 466,
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ther judicial or legislative guidance is necessary to define the abil-
ity of tenants to transfer the right to make such purchases. It is
suggested, however, that future guidelines should not restrict
transferability to an extent which might discourage home owner-
ship and the societal benefits which flow therefrom,25 but rather,
should regulate to the degree necessary to resolve the disputes
which will undoubtedly arise as both tenants and sponsors struggle
to devise more creative means of promoting their respective inter-
ests in the transferability issue.
Daniel J. Baurkot
CPL § 190.25(4); The disclosure of grand jury testimony in a sub-
sequent civil action
Since the fourteenth century, grand jury proceedings have
been held in secret.1 In New York, this practice has been codified
469 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1985)(executor had both right and duty to purchase unit for
deceased tenant's estate); Hohenstein v. Hohenstein, 127 Misc. 2d 53, 56, 485 N.Y.S.2d 170,
172 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1984)(husband remained "tenant in occupancy" and was enti-
tled to purchase at insider price after separation from wife even though he could not physi-
cally occupy apartment until her death).
25 See Ch. 555, § 1, [1982] N.Y. Laws 2396. "[T]he conversion of residential real estate
from rental status to cooperative or condominium ownership is an effective method of pre-
serving, stabilizing and improving neighborhoods and the supply of sound housing accom-
modations." Id.; see Rohan, "The Model Condominium Code" - A Blueprint for Moderniz-
ing Condominium Legislation, 78 COLUM L. Rav. 587, 599 (1978)("occupier-ownership in
the form of ... condominiums offers the best long-range solution to the problem of urban
decay").
The condominium form of ownership may provide a lower-income family with its only
opportunity to purchase a unit having the same characteristics as the "traditional single-
family detached house." Id. In addition to the tax advantages and the ability to share in the
management of the condominium, such families would gain a sense of pride and fulfillment
in being the owners of the apartment. Id. This pride of ownership cannot exist without the
right to profits. Id. at 133.
, See M. FRANKEL & G. NATALus, THE GRAN JuRY 9 (1977). The grand jury dates back
to 1166 when King Henry II formed the Assize of Clarendon to serve as an investigatory and
law enforcement body. See id. at 6-7. The hearing of testimony in private became a practice
of the grand jury during the fourteenth century. See id. at 9. It was not until some 200 years
later, however, that the grand jury broadened its role to include the protection of the inno-
cent from unfounded accusation. See id.
The five most frequently cited reasons for maintaining grand jury confidentiality are:
